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As a direct result of U. S. fiscal expansion, the real value ofthe
dollar has remained much stronger than can be explained solely by
differentials between real interest rates in the U.S. and those abroad.
Forecasts ofthe dollar's value based on a longer run, general equi-
librium model have much smaller errors than those from a short-
run, partial equilibrium model relying on interest rate differentials
alone. Thus, the real value ofthe dollar is likely to remain high by
pre-1980 standards for the foreseeable future unless and until U.S.
or foreign countries change their fiscal policies.
By the summer of 1985, the real trade-
weighted value of the dollar stood at nearly 35
percent above its 1980 value (see Chart 1). In
September, the United States together with
West Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom
and France announced that they were prepared
to undertake coordinated intervention in cur-
rency markets to drive the dollar down and
make it better reflect fundamental economic
conditions. However, there is considerable dis-
agreement among policymakers, academics,
and market participants alike over the funda-
mental forces causing the phenomenal strength
of the dollar. Moreover, a strong argument can
be made that the dollar is not fundamentally
overvalued.
Among the factors most often cited for gen-
erating a strong dollar are the present stance
and future outlook of U.S. budget policy. Ac-
cording to this view, the exchange value of the
dollar has closely followed the course of U.S.
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budget policy relative to budget policies
abroad.
Casual evidence seems to support this link-
age as Chart 2 indicates. Measured on a cycli-
cally adjusted basis, the U.S. general
government fiscal balance has fallen from a
fairly large surplus position in 1980 (0.7 percent
ofpotential GNP) to a large deficit position (1.9
percent of potential GNP) in 1985. Moreover,
the generally expansionary fiscal policy in the
U.S. has not been matched, and in fact has
been counteracted, by restrictive fiscal policies
followed by most other major nations in recent
years. West Germany, for example, reversed a
2.4 percent budget deficit (cyclically adjusted)
in 1980 into a 1.1 percent surplus in 1985. Sim-
ilarly, Japan's large 4.0 percent deficit in 1980
was cut to 1.0 percent by 1985.
However, even among the group of econo-
mists that are convinced of strong causal links
between fiscal policy and real exchange rates,
there is considerable controversy. At least two
views may be distinguished. One view, ex-
pressed for example by former Chairman ofthe
Council ofEconomic Advisers Martin Feldstein
(see Box), states that the influence ofthe recent
U.S. fiscal stimulus on the dollar works pri-
marily through interest rate differentials and
portfolio adjustments. High and rising U.S.
real interest rates associated with domestic27budget deficits, in this view, have created an
interest rate differential that has attracted a for-
eign capital inflow. This inflow has, in turn,
caused a temporary appreciation of the dollar
exchange rate above its long-run equilibrium
value.
The causality described represents a short
fUn and partial equilibrium portfolio balance
perspective. In that perspective, the real value
of the dollar should gradually fall back to its
former level, either because interest rates will
eventually fall or because investors will become
reluctant to invest an increasingly large share
oftheir portfolios in dollar-denominated secu-
rities. A number of major published forecasts
apparently have based their predictions of a
gradually falling dollar on this type of reason-
ing. One problem with the simple portfolio bal-
ance view is that the dollar continued to
strengthen after 1983 even though the real in-
terest rate differential in favor of the U.S. di-
minished sharply, as shown in Chart 1.
An alternative view, expressed for example
in the quotations from Dornbusch (see Box),
does not necessarily question the short-run
links between fiscal policy and exchange rates
working through interest rate differentials and
portfolio preferences. But, it stresses the long-
run effects on goods markets and interest rates
in a world of high capital mobility. This second
link may be characterized as a goods market
channel of transmission.
Basically, this longer run, general equilib-
rium view argues that the U.S. fiscal expansion
has increased both the aggregate demand for
goods worldwide and the relative demand for
U.S. goods (because the fiscal expansion in
the U.S. has led to relatively larger increases
in spending on U.S. goods). Excess demand
for goods in the U.S. and abroad causes an
increase in the general level of world inter-
est rates, while the relative excess demand for
U.S. goods associated with the fiscal stimulus is
eliminated by a real dollar exchange rate ap-
preciation.
This view assumes that U.S. and foreign
goods are imperfect substitutes, and that their
relative price (the real exchange rate) will
change over time in response to shifts in fiscal
policy. No expectation of a subsequent fall in
the value of the dollar back to its original level
is therefore required. Moreover, a high degree
of substitutability between U.S. and foreign fi-
nancial assets limits the extent to which U.S.
real interest rates can diverge from foreign real
interest rates in the long-run.
This paper develops a simple theoretical
model that incorporates both the short-run,
partial equilibrium portfolio balance and the
longer run general equilibrium views ofthe way
exchange rates are influenced by a fiscal stim-
ulus. The portfolio balance view is presented in
Section I, and the general equilibrium view is
explained more fully in Section II. The meth-
odology employed for empirical implementa-
tion of the completed model is presented in
Section III. Empirical tests are performed in
Section IV to estimate the relative importance
of the various factors in influencing the trade-
weighted real value ofthe dollar over the 1974-
1985 floating rate period. The out-of-sample
forecasting performance of the two models, as
well as the performance of a simple random
walk forecast are examined. The final section
draws some conclusions for policy.
I. Interest Rate, Risk and the Exchange Rate:
Portfolio Balance View
To show the linkages between the real ex-
change rate and real interest rate, we used an
approach that is basically a simplification of
Hooper and Morton's (1982) extension of the
sticky-price monetary model of exchange rate
determination developed by Dornbusch (1976)
and Frankel (1979). The exchange rate equa-
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tion in this framework may be derived initially
from the uncovered interest parity condition.
This is an arbitrage condition that states that
the expected percentage change in the ex-
change rate over any period is equal to the dif-
ference between the nominal returns on
securities at home and equally risky securitiesabroad, with maturities for that same period:
Ins lnse=n(i-i*) (1)
Rearranging gives:
In s = n (i - i*) n<j:>e + In se (3)
Equation 2 is a condition that will hold in
internationally integrated financial markets
when investors behave rationally. It simply
states that the market expectation of domestic
currency depreciation over a given period will
be equal to the difference in nominal returns
between securities at home and those abroad
overa similar holding period, less any expected
yield differential. Portfolio balance models sug-
gest that the expected yield differential (risk
premium, <j:>e) will depend on both investors'
preferences and the relative supply of domestic
and foreign securities. If investors view these
securities as imperfect substitutes because of
where i= U.S. interest rate on security with
n years to maturity;
i* = foreign interest rate on a similar se-
curity;
s= foreign currency price ofthe dollar;
se foreign currency price of the dollar
expected to prevail n periods in the
future.
Equation 1 holds when financial capital is
freely mobile across national boundaries and
investors are willing to accept equivalent yields
on U.S. and foreign securities regardless of the
currency of denomination. In this case, any de-
viation from uncovered interest parity would
cause investor arbitrage to bid the exchange
rate back to that point where equation 1 would
again hold.
Under circumstances where U.S. and foreign
assets are less than perfect substitutes, how-
ever, equation 1will not strictly hold as an equi-
librium condition; and U.S. and foreign
expected yields generally will differ. This case
is represented by augmenting equation 1 with
an expected equilibrium yield differential, or
"risk premium", <j:>e:
In s In se = n (i i*) - n<j:>e (2)
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exchange rate risk or other factors, the ex-
pected yield differential would be positively as-
sociated with the supply of domestic debt
relative to debt abroad.
It is convenient to think of the current spot
exchange rate as linked to the future expected
exchange rate through the interest differential.
Equation 3 illustrates this relationship: A given
risk-adjusted interest differential (that is, in-
cluding <j:>e) is consistent with any given spot
exchange rate level, and only indicates the ex-
pected change in the (log) level ofthe exchange
rate over the maturity ofthe bonds in question.
Once expectations about the future spot rate
are identified, however, the spot rate is deter-
mined. The link between the current price of a
currency and its expected future price is hence
quite strong, as it is in the case of any asset
price.
Equation 3 also holds in real (or price-ad-
justed) terms. 1 Thus,
lnq = n(r-r*) - n<j:>e + lnqe (4)
where q = real value of the dollar;
qe = real value of the dollar expected n
years hence;
r= U.S. real interest rate;
r* = foreign real interest rate.
The difference between the current real ex-
change rate and its expected future value-that
is, the expected change in the real value of the
currency-is thus proportional to the expected
(risk-adjusted) real interest rate differential,
r r* <j:>e. For example, a one-percent rise
in the U.S. one-year real (risk-adjusted) inter-
est rate above the equivalent foreign rate would
appreciate the real value of the dollar by one
percent above the spot value expected one year
hence. This sets up the expectation of a one-
percent dollar depreciation over the course of
the year, which, in turn, equalizes expected
risk-adjusted yields on the underlying foreign
and domestic securities. Thus, the dynamics of
exchange rate changes are implicit in the rela-
tive yield differential across currencies. This
process is illustrated in Diagram 1. An impor-
tant point to note, however, is that the effectDiagram 1
Real Exchange Rate Response
to Rise in the Domestic
Real Intererst Rate Differential
log of real
exchange rate
The real exchange rate is price of the dollar in units of
foreign currency (price adjusted). The risk adjusted real
interest differential (r r* <pe) rises at point tl,
causing an appreciation in the dollar exchange rate from
qo to ql)' Over the maturity of the interest rate in
question (from tl to t2), the exchange rate gradually
depreciates and causes a capital loss on domestic
securities which exactly offsets the explicit additional
interest rate return. At time t2 the exchange rate returns
to its original equilibrium value.
of interest rate variations on exchange rates is
temporary, Over the maturity of the particular
rate in question, the spot real exchange rate is
expected to return to a fixed equilibrium value.
A central aspect of this theory is its emphasis
on term structure effects. For example, if the
I-year U.S. real interest rate goes up by 1 per-
centage point, but future I-year interest rates
are not expected to change, then the real value
ofthe dollar will go up only 1percentage point.
However, if the same increase in the U.S. 1-
year rate is expected to last for 5 years, then
the 5-year bond rate will immediately rise by 1
percentage point and the real exchange value
of the dollar will rise by 5 percentage points.
Thus, the long-term real interest differential
controls movements in the real exchange rate.
The expected long-run real value of the ex-
change rate, or the relative value of a represen-
tative bundle of domestic goods in comparison
to their foreign counterparts, is assumed to be
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roughly constant. Budget deficits, whether of a
transitory or more permanent nature, do not
alter the expected long-run real value of the
dollar in this framework. The assumption of a
fixed long-run relative price between domestic
andforeign goods provides a convenient anchor
on which expectations of the future real ex-
change rate can be based. Furthermore, the dy-
namics of exchange rate adjustment to interest
rate shocks can also be derived from this as-
sumption.
The real interest rate/real exchange rate link
may be thought of as a portfolio balance chan-
nel through which budget deficits influence the
real exchange rate. A rise in the U.S. budget
deficit, to the extent that it causes U.S. real
interest rates to rise above world levels, attracts
a foreign capital inflow that temporarily appre-
ciates the real value of the dollar, q, above its
expected long-run equilibrium value, qe. The
dollar appreciates to the point where an ex-
pected future depreciation is set up that (in or-
der to maintain internationally comparable
yields on dollar and foreign investments) just
offsets the extra interest rate return on dollar
assets compared with foreign currency denom-
inated assets. In other words, the dollar appre-
ciates until an offsetting expected capital loss is
created. In this view, the influence of budget
deficits on exchange rates through the interest
rate channel is transitory.
The pattern ofinitial exchange rate apprecia-
tion followed by gradual depreciation will occur
in this framework regardless ofwhether budget
deficits are perceived as temporary or longer
lasting. In the former case, both interest rates
and the exchange rate would rise and gradually
fall back to their initial levels as financial mar-
ket pressures associated with transitory budget
imbalances subside. In the case oflonger lasting
budget deficits, however, interest rates would
rise and stay above their initial values for as
long as private aggregate demand is "crowded
out" by the fiscal stimulus. This would not pre-
clude a subsequent gradual exchange rate de-
preciation-as expressed in the quotation by
Feldstein-if the expected return differential
(<j>e) gradually rises over time in response to the
accumulation of government debt associatedwith the longer lasting government deficit. In
both cases-temporary or longer lasting budget
deficits-the portfolio balance view predicts
that the real exchange rate gradually depre-
ciates and returns to its original level (qe).
However, both cases exemplify a partial equi-
librium model because qe is eitherassumed con-
stant or determined outside the model.
II. Goods Markets, Interest Rates and the Exchange Rate:
General Equilibrium View
where y (y*) Yo (y;)), fixed domestic
(foreign) output
A (A*) = domestic (foreign) absorption of
goods and services, i.e. both
home production and imports
(A = C + I + G)
NX(NX*) domestic (foreign) country net
exports
aA aA* and ~-- <0 .-- < 0 .
ar ' ar* '
effects of the fiscal stimulus. An appreciation
ofthe real exchange rate accomplishes this both
by lowering the private demand for domesti-
cally produced goods (exports and import-com-
peting goods), and by raising that component
of domestic demand directed towards imports.2
To put this argument in more formal terms,
consider the equilibrium conditions for domes-
tic and foreign goods markets, assuming a com-
plete adjustment to full employment in both the




We have three unknowns (r, r*, and q) but only
two equations. However, r can be solved as
equal to r* in the case where U.S. and foreign
assets are perfect substitutes, or equal to r* + 4>
in the risk premium case. This reduces the sys-
tem to two equations and two unknowns.3
Diagram 2 provides a graphical representa-
tion of this system.4 The downward sloping (q,
r
US
) locus, or GHs, is the U.S. (domestic coun-
try) goods market clearing condition, that rep-
resents equation 5. It is downward sloping
because, for any given level of output, a fall in
The longer run, general equilibrium view of
the budget deficit/real exchange rate link ab-
stracts from the dynamics of expected changes
in the exchange rate. The analysis is static and
longer run so that expected and actual exchange
rates do not differ. It focuses on the potential
for budget policy to alter the real exchange rate
in the long-run, and therefore to cause shifts in
the expected equilibrium real exchange rate
(qe) that enters into the shorter run portfolio
balance approach.
While the portfolio balance view allows for
assets denominated in different currencies to be
imperfect substitutes (4)e 4= 0), it in effect as-
sumes that domestic and foreign goods are per-
fect substitutes, making their expected
equilibrium relative price (qe) constant. The
general equilibrium model, in contrast, allows
goods produced in different countries to be im-
perfect substitutes and allows their equilibrium
relative price to change in response to shifts in
the supply and demand for domestically pro-
duced versus foreign goods. The real exchange
rate in this framework is a key factor helping
to maintain a balance in domestic and foreign
goods markets.
For example, a domestic fiscal stimulus-ef-
fected through either an increase in expendi-
tures or a reduction in taxes-will increase the
demand for both domestic and foreign goods,
but is likely to raise the demand for domestic
goods more. This relative rise in domestic de-
mand, in turn, will put upward pressure on the
domestic real interest rate relative to the for-
eign real interest rate. But since, in a world of
high capital mobility, interest rates at home and
abroad can differ by only a relatively small risk
premium, the resulting inflow of capital will be
sufficient to raise the domestic real exchange
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Diagram 2
Effects of U.S. Fiscal Expansion
when U.S. and Foreign Assets
are Perfect Substitutes
q (depreciation of the real value of the dollar)
stimulates net exports and must be offset by
lower U.S. absorption brought about by an in-
crease in the U.S. real interest rate. Gbow, the
rest-of-world (foreign) goods market equilib-
rium locus (q, rrOW), is upward sloping for anal-
ogous reasons. In this case, however, a fall in
q represents an appreciation of the foreign cur-
rency, and hence a contraction of rest-of-world
net exports to the U.S. This is offset by a fall
in rest-of-world interest rates and a correspond-
ing rise in Arow (rest-of-world absorption) to
maintain equilibrium in the rest-of-world goods
market.
In the no risk premium case, the initial steady
state equilibrium is found at the intersection of
the goods market equilibrium schedules for the
U.S. and the rest of the world, or point a,
where r~s = rbow. Depending on the state ofdo-
mestic aggregate demand and output relative to
demand and output abroad, the U.S. has either
positive or negative net exports.
Consider the comparative statics of a U.S.
fiscal expansion. As U.S. fiscal expansion in-
creases the demand for U.S. goods and ser-
vices, domestic absorption (A
llS
) rises
correspondingly. This shifts the U.S. goods
market locus upward from G~s to Gys because,
for any given real exchange rate, higher U.S.
real interest rates are necessary to offset the
risein absorption and to restore equilibrium.
Similarly, to the extent that the rise in U.S.
government expenditures falls on foreign
goods, the demand for rest-of-world netexports
rises·(atan unchanged real exchange rate) and
Gbowshifts upward to Glow. The rise in aggre-
gate demand in both countries thus causes U.S.
and rest-of-world interest rates to rise.
Most ofthe rise in aggregate demand falls on
U.S. output, however. As long as U.S. andrest-
of-world securities are perfect substitutes-
which implies equal real rates ofreturn in static
equilibrium (rys = rlOW)-the incipient real in-
terest differential in favor of the U.S. appreci-
ates the dollar real exchange rate to divert
private demand away from U.S.-produced
goods towards foreign-produced goods. A gen-
eral equilibrium is restored at point b, where
the higher level ofworld interest rates dampens
excess world aggregate demand (U.S. plus rest-
of-world) pushed up by the U.S. fiscal stimulus,
while dollar appreciation (from qo to ql) damp-
ens the relative excess demand for U.S.-pro-
duced goods.5 Unlike the short-run portfolio
balance model, the dollar appreciates without
any increase in the equilibrium real interest
rate differential.
The possibility of a risk premium (<!> *' 0),
or real yield differential, is easily incorporated
into this framework. As noted earlier, a risk
premium could arise if, over time, investors be-
come reluctant to absorb an increasingly large
share of U.S. debt into their portfolios. As
shown in Diagram 3, a gradual rise in the risk
premium (from an assumed initial value of
zero) associated with cumulative U.S. budget
deficits would allow a gap in the static equilib-
rium real interest differential.
In the case of a U.S. debt-financed fiscal
stimulus, the U.S. real interest rate would rise
above the rest-of-world interest rate (rYs >
rlOW), and the difference would be reflected in
the gap between the GYs and GloW loci at an
equilibrium real exchange rate to the left of
point b (points c, c1 for example). The result is
that both the rest-of-world interest rate (rlOW)
u.s. Real Interest Rate Rest-at-World
Real Interest Rate
32qo q1
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Diagram 3
Effects of· U.S. Fiscal Expansion
when U.S. and Foreign Assets
are Imperfect Substitutes
Rest-of-World
Real Interest Rate U.S. Real Interest Rate
and the value of the U.S. dollar (ql) rise less
than in the no risk premium case. Once again,
the result differs from the portfolio balance
view in that, in the goods market view, the dol-
lar normally appreciatesfollowing a fiscal stim-
ulus in the U.S. even though there is no change
in the risk-adjusted differential between real in-
terest rates.
However, in the extreme case in which the
risk premium grows so large that it leaves the
real exchange rate and the rest of the world's
interest rate unchanged, the end result is the
same as that characterized by the portfolio bal-
ance view. That is, over the longer run the U.S.
interest rate would rise enough to cause a fall
in domestic interest-sensitive expenditures that
entirely offsets the fiscal expansion's impact.
The introductory quotation by Feldstein ex-
presses this view of how the economy adjusts
to ongoing fiscal deficits.6
m. Estimation Methodology
In the short-run, partial equilibrium portfo-
lio balance approach, the real value of the ex-
change rate is expected to return to a constant
expected long-run real value. In contrast, in the
general equilibrium analysis, persistent budget
deficits change the long-run equilibrium value
of the real exchange rate. Because exchange
market participants have a time horizon of at
least several years, a combination of both ap-
proaches is required for explaining the actual
behavior of exchange rates.
In a static long-run equilibrium, interest rates
can diverge by only the amount of the risk pre-
mium. In the short-run, larger disparities in in-
terest rates can temporarily occur, but they are
counterbalanced by expected changes in the ex-
change rate. A useful synthesis ofthe two views
therefore embeds a rational expectation of
longer run equilibrium into the short-run dy-
namics of the portfolio balance approach.
In the general equilibrium model, the real
exchange rate may depart from its original
value even over extended periods of time. It
can be altered by changes in tastes, technology,
or supplies of productive factors. It can also be
affected by imbalances between private saving
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and investment caused by budget deficits, or by
changes in the risk premium. In our empirical
estimation, we abstract from factors other than
fiscal deficits that might cause changes in the
equilibrium real exchange rate. Thus, the log
ofthe real exchange rate expected in the future
is assumed equal to some constant plus a func-
tion of the expected U.S. budget balance (B)
and the rest ofthe world's budget balance (B*):
In qe = ao - al Be + a2 B*e (7)
Substituting equation 7 into equation 4 yields
the synthesis of the two views to be estimated:
In q = ao + n(r - r*) - n<l>e (8)
- a1Be + a2 B*e
To empirically estimate this model, we use
Morgan Guaranty's real trade-weighted value
of the dollar for q. We also calculated trade-
weighted measures ofreal interest rates and ex-
pected budget balances. Because of data limi-
tations, variables for the rest of the world were
limited to the six largest OEeD countries.7
As pointed out earlier, the real interest dif-
ferential dominating movements in the real ex-
change rate is the long-term one. Rather thanattempting to construct direct measures oflong-
term inflation expectations for each country, we
used an indirect approach based upon the the-
ory of the term structure of interest rates. Our
model of the real long-term bond rate is based
on the "preferred habitat" theory of the term
structure of interest rates developed by Modig-
liani and others. This approach synthesizes the
market segmentation and expectational theo-
ries of the term structure.
In this approach, the long-term interest rate
is equal to the average of expected short-term
rates, modified by a risk premium that reflects
preferences of the two sides of the market for
long versus short securities. In the original
statement by Modigliani and Sutch (1966), the
past history of nominal short-term rates is used
to forecast expected future nominal rates.
Therefore, the long-term bond rate is explained
by the past history of short rates and a risk
premium represented by a constant term. Anal-
ogously, in an inflationary world, one can
model the real long-term bond rate as a func-
tion of the past history of real short-term rates
(proxying for expected real short-term rates)
plus a constant term to represent the risk pre-
mium.
For the real short-term interest rate in the
U.S., we used the 6-month commercial paper
rate. We forecasted inflation on the basis ofpast
changes in Ml and past inflation.8 Foreign in-
terest rates are 90-day interbank rates, or the
nearest equivalent. Expected inflation abroad
was measured by the rate of change in con-
sumer prices over the previous four quarters.9
The empirical results are not particularly sen-
sitive to various alternative measures of ex-
pected inflation.
In earlier work, it was found that the U.S.
real bond rate can be satisfactorily explained
by an l1-quarter distributed lag on the real
short-term interest rate.lO Consequently, we
have modeled the real long-term interest rate
differential, r - r*, by an II-quarter distrib-
uted lag on the difference between the real 6-
month commercial paper rate and the trade-
weighted value of real short-term interest rates
abroad.ll The estimated coefficient on this syn-
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thetic real long-term rate differential equals n,
or the relevant time horizon of investors in
the market, times the sum of the weights in the
distributed lag on short rates. But since the lat-
ter should theoretically sum to a value close to
one, the sum of these estimated coefficients
should approximate n.
To measure anticipated budget surpluses or
deficits (expected values of Band B*), a mov-
ing average of the actual high employment, or
structural, budget balance for one year ahead
was used. Structural budget balances are pref-
erable to actual (non-cyclically adjusted) defi-
cits because they better capture the goods
market pressures associated with fiscal policy
shifts. The one-year ahead measure was found
to give more satisfactory results than a moving
average over longer time horizons. Budget bal-
ances more than one year ahead cannot be
known with any high degree of certainty be-
cause they can always be altered by policy
changes. And even though the relevant time
horizon of participants in the foreign exchange
market is likely longer than one year, the struc-
tural budget balance for one-year ahead ap-
pears to be as good as any other indicator of
the expected value of future structural budget
balances.
We tried both inflation-adjusted and unad-
justed structural budget balances, measured as
a percent of potential GNP, in empirical esti-
mates of the model. The inflation-adjusted
measures treat the amount of the inflationary
erosion in the real value ofoutstanding govern-
ment debt as a receipt. Their appropriateness
for this analysis depends upon the behavior of
the private sector. To the extent that changes
in real wealth affect household consumption,
the inflation-adjusted indicator may be a more
accurate gauge offiscal impact on the economy
than the unadjusted one. But if the inflation
premium embedded in the interest rate were
treated as disposable income, the nominal com-
ponent of interest rates would affect consump-
tion and the "inflation tax" would not. The
unadjusted structural budget balance would
then be the more appropriate one.12The final variable requiring explanation is the
expected risk premium, <pc. This yield differ-
ential is determined by. tIle interaction of de-
mand and supply for assets in both the home
and foreign countries. Following the large body
of literature on the topic (e.g., Dornbusch,
1980; Frankel, 1982; Hutchison, 1984), we fo-
cus on the relative supplies and demands for
government debt ("outside" assets). This ap-
proach assumes that exchange risk on privately
issued "inside" assets is eliminated by portfolio
diversification. 13
An increase in the supply of domestic gov-
ernment debt, other things equal, causes a rise
in the risk premium. In contrast, a rise in the
proportion of domestic financial wealth in total
world wealth, assuming domestic investors pre-
fer the home country habitat, would cause a
rise in the demand for domestic government
debt and therefore lower the risk premium.
The excess ofdomestic financial wealthover the
domestic supply is represented by the cumula-
tive domestic current account surplus. The do-
mestic current account surplus represents the
surplus ofdomestic national saving over private
investment.
The risk premium can therefore be expressed
as:
<
ao -- 0; a1 > 0; a2 < O.
>
where Ds represents the supply of U.S. govern-
ment debt, Ww represents the total supply of
government debt (both foreign and domestic),
and 2:CA represents the cumulative U.S. cur-
rent account surplus. 14
IV. Empirical Results and Forecasts
Tables 1 and 2 present empirical estimates of
three formulations of the real exchange rate
model. The tables use structural budget bal-
ances adjusted for inflation and ordinary struc-
tural budget balances, respectively. As shown
in Chart 2, the inflation-adjusted budget is al-
ways in larger surplus than the ordinary budget
balance as long as inflation is positive because
the adjustment for inflation treats the erosion
in the real value of government debt as a tax.
The inflation-adjustment can be relatively
large-as much as 2 percent of GNP for the
United States and somewhat larger for other
major OECD countries. But the pattern of var-
iation over time has been fairly similar for both
budget concepts. In the United States, the larg-
est difference between them occurs from 1978
to 1981 when inflation first rose quite sharply
and then dropped even more abruptly. This
caused the inflation-adjusted budget first to
shift more sharply into surplus and then to fall
more rapidly into deficit.
Columns 1-3 in both tables show estimates
of three real exchange rate models for the
1974:03 through 1981:04 sample period, and
columns 4-6 show estimates for the 1974:03
through 1984:03 full sample period. The
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shorter sample period was estimated to evalu-
ate the stability of the estimated model coeffi-
cients and to perform out-of-sample forecasts
that can be compared with actual movements
in the dollar exchange rate. The shorter sample
ends at the time when U.S. budget deficits were
beginning to rise sharply relative to GNP and
foreign deficits had begun to decline. Out-of-
sample forecasts of recent experience therefore
provide a useful test of the importance of U.S.
and foreign budget balances, relative to the im-
portance of real interest rate differentials, in
affecting the real value of the dollar.
The three real exchange equations estimated
represent the model containing only real inter-
est differentials (columns 1 and 4), the model
containing both real interest differentials and
U.S. and foreign budget balances (columns 2
and 5), and the full model which includes real
interest differentials, budget balances and the
risk premium determinants (columns 3 and 6).
In Table 1, which contains the inflation-ad-
justed budgets, the estimates·ofthe coefficients
on the risk premium variables are statistically
insignificant. However, lack of statistically sig-
nificant risk premium variables is consistent
with previous research (e.g., Frankel, 1982;TABLE 1
Real Exchange Value·of the Dollar:
Regression Estimates With Inflation-Adjusted•Structural BUdget Surpluses1
Sample: 1974:03 - 1981 :04 Sample: 1974:03 - 1984:03
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 4.44 4.59 4.49 4.82 4.61 4.47
(179.1) (85.4) (151.2) (27.6) (191.4) (171.9)
11 4.78 3.40 3.50 4.16 3.46 4.24
2: (rs - r:) (4.58) (3.70) ( 7.20) (3.42) (4.49) (8.91) i=O
Be -4.30 -4.11 -4.48 -2.83
(-3.05) (-7.00) (-7.60) (-5.44)
B*e 2.96 1.94 3.22 1.00





R 2 .84 .88 .92 .95 .97 .98
SER .019 .017 .013 .022 .018 .015
P .71 .59 -.21 .98 .62 .16
(5.44) (3.96) (-1.19) (33.4) (5.03) (1.02)
D.W. 1.68 2.00 2.22 1.65 1.84 1.88
1 See text for definitions of variables and data sources. All equations were estimated using ordinary least squares and
the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to adjust for first-order serial correlation. The t-ratios are in parentheses.
TABLE 2
Real Exchange Value of the Dollar:
Regression Estimates With Ordinary Structural Budget Surpluses1
Sample: 1974:03 - 1981 :04 Sample: 1974:03 - 1984:03
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 4.44 4.54 4.37 4.82 4.62 4.40
(179.1) (55.9) (91.9) (27.6) (94.4) (77.6)
11 4.78 3.70 4.07 4.16 3.22 4.61
2:(rs - rs*) (4.58) (3.02) (7.25) (3.42) (3.38) (8.27) i=O
Be -4.19 -4.28 -5.86 3.35
(-2.19) (-4.49) (-4.82) (-4.42)
B*e 1.90 -0.22 3.77 0.12





R 2 .84 .86 .90 .95 .97 .97
SER .019 .018 .016 .022 .018 .016
P .70 .72 -.03 .98 .73 .17
(5.44) (5.76) (-0.19) (33.9) (6.86) (1.13)
D.W. 1.69 2.00 2.01 1.65 1.91 1.93
1 See Table 1 notes.
36Danker, et.aI., 1984; and others), indicating
that risk premia oninternationally traded assets
are small, vary with time, and are difficult to
associate systematically with structural vari-
ables.
In contrast, the model estimates in Table 1
give statistically significant coefficients on the
real interest differential (r - r*), the expected
U.S. structural budget balance (Be), and the
expected foreign structural budget balance
(B*e) of the theoretically predicted signs. Also,
there is a high degree of stability between the
estimates from the shorter and longer sample
periods.
An increase of 1 percentage point in the real
long-term interest rate differential in favor of
the U.S. is estimated to have raised the real
trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar by 3.5
percent in the 1974:03-1984:03 sample pe-
riod (column 5). This estimate is consistent with
the view that investors in the market have a
time horizon of roughly 3-4years. A rise in the
U.S. budget surplus by 1 percent of GNP is
estimated to reduce the real trade-weighted
value ofthe dollar by 4.5 percent. And a similar
movement in the budget balances of ourmajor
trading partners is estimated to raise the real
value of the dollar by 3.2 percent.
The estimates using ordinary structural
budget balances (not inflation-adjusted).shown
in·Table 2 provide similar but somewhat less
robust results. The estimated real interest dif-
ferential and budget balance coefficients are
again of the predicted signs and highlysignifi-
cant in the full sample, whereas the risk pre-
mium variables are statistically insignificant.
-2 The goodness of fit (R ), standard error, and
other summary statistics are also very similar.
However, the coefficient on the foreign budget
balance is statistically insignificant in the
shorter sample. Moreover, the coefficient esti-
mates using ordinary budget balances are less
stable across the two samples. Since these re-
sults suggest that the behavior of the private
sector is affected, at least to some extent, by
the wealth changes included in the inflation-ad-
justed measure of the budget balance, further
discussion of the empirical results and forecasts
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37Theresllltsthlls far presented provide con-
siderable sllpportJor the general equilibrium
modelandsllggestthat the omission of ex-
pected.structllralbudget balances from the
portfQlio.balance{node!is.a serious error. They
alsoindicate that the U.S. fiscal stimulus has
hadsignifi~antimpacton the dollar and that its
inflllencehasworkedthrough goods market
pressllfesandinterestrate.differentials, but not
through a risk premium.
Chart1.sho\Ysthemovement in the real long-
term interestdifferential between the U.S. and
other major GECD countries implied by our
estimated modelfrom 1974 through the second
quarter of 1985. 15 The real long-term interest
rate differentiaUn favor of the U.S. peaked in
1982 at around 4 percent and has since dropped
sharply to around 1 percent in the second
quarter of 1985. At the same time, the real
value of the dollar continued to rise until early
1985. The shift of the U.S. budget into deficit
and an accompanying movement of foreign
budget balances towards surplus, shown in
Chart 2, helps to explain the otherwise puzzling
opposite movement between the real exchange
rate and the real interest rate differential.
Estimates derived from the shorter sample
period (1974:03-1981:04) shed further light
on this explanation of the cllrrentstrength of
the dollar (Table 1, columns 1 and 2) and also
provide an indication of the stabilityoLtheex-
change rate model. These equations were used
to make out-of-sample forecasts of the real
value of the dollar through the second quarter
of 1985. The results are
expected, the exchange rate model containing
only the real interest rate differential forecasts
a steadily declining real value. for the dollar
after 1982. In contrast, the exchange rate model
that also includes budget balances forecasts the
extraordinary strength ofthe dollar out-of-sam-
ple rather well. Its forecast is almost exactlyon
track through the end of 1984, but misses the
spike in the value of the dollar early in 1985.
A recent study by Meese and Rogoff (1983)
has tested the out-of-sample forecasting prop-
erties of the most widely employed empirical
exchange rate models. Their conclusion was
that a random walk model, which uses the cur-
rent exchange rate to predict future rates, gen-
erally had smaller out-of-sample forecasting
error variance than any ofthe structural models
Chart 2
U.S. and Foreign Structural Budget Balances
















yexamined. Interest rate differentials are an im-
portant element in a number of the models
tested by Meese and Rogoff, but none of these
models contains domestic orforeign budget bal-
ances.
In the post-1981 period, the random walk
model has a smaller root mean square error
(equal to 14.7) in forecasting the real value of
the dollar than doe~ the model containing only
the real interest differential (equal to 18.1).
This result comes as no surprise since it paral-
lels the earlier findings of Meese and Rogoff.
It is noteworthy, however, that the root mean
square error of the out-of-sample forecast from
the exchange rate model that includes U.S. and
foreign budget balances as well as the real in-
terest differential is much smaller (at 5.39) than
that for either alternative forecast.
Out-of-sample fit is an important criterion to
consider when evaluating any econometric
model. This seems particularly true for ex-
change rate models, which appear to be subject
to more than the usual degree of instability.
Our out-of-sample forecasts suggest that a
model stressing the importance of direct fiscal
effects on the real value of the dollar, and not
limited to indirect effects operating through in-
terest rate differentials or risk premium deter-
minants alone, gets a distinctly better rating
than do most other models of exchange rate
determination. The direct effect of fiscal policy
on the longer run equilibrium value of the dol-
lar is a largely neglected theoretical point, but
one that appears to be highly important in prac-
tice.
v. Conclusion
This paper has presented two alternative tinue to depreciate either because ofa declining
views on the way fiscal policy influences real real interest rate differential or because of
exchange rates. Each leads to substantially dif- investors' reluctance to continue to absorb U.S.
ferent conclusions about the future course of dollar-denominated debt into their portfolios.
the dollar in the foreign exchange market. The The second view, based on a longer run, gen-
first view, based on a short-run, partial equilib- eral equilibrium model, predicts that the dollar
rium portfolio balance model of exchange rate is likely to remain strong by the standards of
determination, predicts that the dollar will con- the late 1970s. In particular, this view suggests
Chart 3
Real Trade-Weighted Dollar







1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
39that as long as U.S. structural budget deficits
relative to those abroad, the real
value of the dollar should remain substantially
aboveits pre-1980 level.
Empirical estimates and out-of-sample fore-
castsbased on the two alternative views largely
support the "strong dollar" prediction of the
general equilibrium model. Recent dollar de-
clines appear mainly to be related to a narrow-
ing r~alinterest rate differential between the
U.S. and abroad, and not to investors' reluc-
tance to continue to absorb increasingly large
amounts of U.S. debt into their portfolios.
There is very little evidence that a significant
exchange risk premium on dollar assets exists,
or will soon develop.
In the absence of substantialifurther declines
in U.S. real interest rates (or increases in for-
eign rates), our results suggest that aggregate
demand pressures associated with U.S. budget
deficits could well keep the dollar strong in the
intermediate term. This conclusion contrasts
with what appears to be the majority opinion
of economists and forecasters. Although we ac-
cept the theoretical possibility of the consensus
view that the dollar is likely to continue to fall
in the near term, ourevidence and that ofother
studies provides little empirical support for it.
A large number of analysts apparently hold
to the opinion that the dollar must ultimately
fallback to its pre-1980 level because a persist-
enty high dollar value would continue to gen-
erate, in their view, unsustainably large U.S.
current account deficits. This conclusion is
based on the assumption that foreigners will not
be willing to finance U.S. current account def-
icits at their present magnitude indefinitely.
The rising stock of U.S. external debt, it is usu-
ally argued, will eventually generate large risk
premia on U.S. assets. A rising risk pn:mllUnl,
in turn, would cause U.S. interest rates to rise
and the real value of the dollar to fall.
One recent projection (Krugman, 1985) in-
dicates that if the dollar only gradually depre-
ciated from its present high level, the U.S.
foreign-debt-to-GNP ratio would continue to
climb for the next 23 years, stabilizing at
roughly 46 percent. If this were considered an
unsustainably high ratio, then the implication
is that the equilibrium value of the dollar must
be considerably less than its present value.
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Admittedly, our theoretical and empirical
analysis does not purport to deal with a time
horizon of a quarter of a century and a full
long-run steady state stock equilibrium. But, as
shown in Hutchison and Pigott (1985), our
basic model's predictions appear to be reason-
able even in the context of very long-run
growth.16 Moreover, we believe that time ho-
most market participants are relatively
short. Our empirical estimates suggest horizons
of roughly three to four years, and an informal
of actual participants in the foreign ex-
change market suggests even shorter time ho-
rizons.
Even if market expectations are formed on a
time horizon as long as a steady state analysis
implicitly entails, there is some question as to
whether a 46 percent foreign debt-to-GNP ratio
for the U.S. is implausibly large. A number of
countries less politically stable than the U.S.
have external debts considerably larger than
half of their GNP. And, given the status of the
U.S. dollar as the premier investment, reserve
and international transactions currency, world
demand for U.S. assets is presumably (propor-
tionally) larger than thatfor most othernations.
In conclusion, our results suggest that the
real value of the dollar could well remain high
by pre-1980 standards for the foreseeable fu-
ture. Its strength is caused by aggregate de-
mand pressures associated with greater fiscal
expansion in the U.S. than abroad, combined
with the general willingness of foreign lenders
to finance U.S. current account deficits. More-
over, there is little evidence to suggest that the
dollar's underlying strength is a speculative
bubble that could easily be punctured by fur-
ther official exchange market intervention. In
early 1985, the dollar was indeed stronger than
could be explained by fundamental factors. But
by the third quarter a subsequent depreciation
hadmovedthedollarbackinto linewiththevalue
predicted by our model.17 At the present time,
coordinated policies designed to reduce fiscal
imbalances between the United States and
abroad would likely be the most effective ap-
proach to bringing about a significant and lon-
glasting decline in the real exchange value of
the dollar in a non-inflationary environment.FOOTNOTES
P*
s = q P
In q n [(i - p) (i* - p*)] n<j>e + In qe
or In q = n (r - r*) - n<j>e + In qe
qe P*(1 + p*)n
~~"'-"""'''~~'~'~~~-
P (1 + p)n
1. To show that (3) holds in real (price-adjusted) as well
as nominal terms, we define the real exchange rate (q) and
the future real exchange rate (qe)expected to prevail n pe-
riods hence as:
ysis. This is that the former, the aggregate demand for
goods worldwide is increased by a larger budget deficit (at
the initial level of interest rates), while in the latter aggre-
gate demand rises in the country receiving the transfer
payment but falls in the paying country as the amount of
the transfer payment is collected. In the classical case of
no change in worldwide aggregate demand, the transfer of
rea! resources can be carried out through a change in the
trade balance without any alteration in the real exchange
rate so long as the marginal propensities of the two coun-
tries to import sum to one. See Caves and Johnson (1968,
pp. 115-171) and Mundell (1960). However, in the case of
a fiscal expansion in only one of the countries, for there to
be no change in the real exchange rate, it is necessary
that fiscal expansion increase the demand for foreign
goods as much as the demand for home goods.
4. This diagram comes from Dornbusch (1983) and Blan-
chard and Dornbusch (1984).
5. The difference between the classical transfer problem
and the general equilibrium view of the effect of a budget
deficit on the exchange rate can be illustrated with Diagram
2. The shift of Ggs to G¥s and GSow to GlOW could just
as well be produced by the effect on U.S. income of a
transfer payment to the U.S. from the rest of the world. As
the diagram is drawn, the propensity of the U.S. to spend
the transfer on U.S. goods is greater than the propensity
to import, so GUs shifts by more than Grow.
However, unlike the case of pure fiscal expansion in the
U.S., in the classical transfer analysis the collection of the
transfer abroad through taxation has income effects that
reduce the demand for home goods and imports there. If
the sum of the marginal propensities to import in the two
countries were equal to one, the relatively large propensity
of the U.S. to spend on domestic goods would be matched
by an equally large propensity by the rest of the world to
import. Adding the income effects for the rest of the world
from the transfer to the diagram, the G¥s schedule would
therefore shift back exactly to Ggs and, similarly, GioW
would shift back to Gbo
W As a result, when the sum of the
import propensities equals one, a pure transfer payment
from the rest of the world to the U.S. would effect the re-
quired movement in real resources through a deterioration
in the U.S. trade balance without any change in either the
real exchange rate or the world interest rate.
6. This view has been widely expressed. Another example
is Branson (1985). Moreover, in the analysis of Branson
and others, the exchange rate will eventually deprl;'lciate
below its initial level. This is because a zero balance cur-
rent account is assumed to be a necessary equilil;Jrium
condition in the no-growth context oftheir models. Because
the initial exchange rate appreciation causes a fall in net
exports and an associated foreign capital inflow, the U.S.
external debt rises. To generate a trade balance surplus
that equals the net foreign debt interest payments (keeping
a balanced current account), the exchange rate will fall
below its initial level (see Rodriquez, 1979).
7. These are Japan, West Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, and Canada.
8. The estimated equation for forecasting U.S. inflation
over the maturity of the 6 month commercial paper rate is:
r = i
r* = j* p*
where
where
P = U.S. price level;
P* foreign price level;
p = expected U.S. inflation rate (annualized);
p* expected foreign inflation rate (annualized).
Taking logarithms of these two equations and substituting
into equation 3, one gets:
2. This is a description of the adjustment to a fiscal stim-
ulus in a world of flexible exchange rates and relatively
unchanged price levels. The logic of the argument can be
applied equally well to a world of fixed exchange rates and
flexible price levels. As before, the fiscal stimulus is as-
sumed to produce more of an increase in the demand for
domestic goods than in the demand for foreign goods. In
a world of fixed exchange rates, the result would be an
increase in domestic prices relative to foreign prices. With
a given nominal exchange rate, this relative change in
prices implies an appreciation in the domestic real ex-
change rate.
3. This model is essentially a classical, or full employment,
version of the Mundell-Fleming model of fiscal policy in a
world of perfect capital mobility. See Mundell (1963) and
Fleming (1962). However, the assumption about the rela-
tive impact of fiscal policy on spending in the two countries
is also crucial to the outcome for the real exchange rate.
If fiscal expansion increased the demand for foreign goods
as much as the demand for home goods, there could be
no impact on the exchange rate.
This part of the analysis is similar to the classical transfer
problem. The literature on the classical transfer problem
deals with the question of how a financial transfer of pur-
chasing power between two countries-for example
through gifts, reparations payments, or capital flows-ef-
fects a corresponding transfer of real resources. A question
of particular importance in this literature is whether a
change in the real exchange rate is required to effect the
transfer. The answer turns on the income effects of the
transfer on spending in the two countries. A famous early
discussion of the transfer problem was between J.M.
Keynes and Berti! Ohlin with regard to German reparations
payments. See Ellis and Metzler (1950, pp. 161-179).
There is an important difference, however, between the
effect of a fiscal expansion and the classical transfer anal-
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R2 = .812 S.E. = 1.26
Equations based on monetary growth overpredict inflation
in 1982 and 1983 by a substantial margin because of an
unusual decline in M1 velocity. However, the demand for
M1 was stable, so the decline in M1 velocity can be ex-
plained statistically by the decline in inflation and nominal
interest rates that occurred in the period. If M1 growth is
adjusted for this effect, it continues to predict the growth
of nominal income and inflation reasonably well. Conse-
quently, for this period, an adjusted M1 growth was used
in the inflation forecasting equation instead of actual M1
growth. The adjustment factors that were used are de-
scribed in Judd and McElhattan (1983). For an analysis of
the effect of the decline in velocity on inflation and why it
occurred, see Throop (1984a, b).
9. The source of the interest rate data is the Board of
Governors' macrodata library. The data on consumer
prices is from the International Monetary Fund, Interna-
tional Financial Statistics.
10. See Throop (1984,c).
11. The trade-weights used are those described in "Index
of the Weighted-Average Value of the U.S. Dollar: Revi-
sion," Federal Reserve Bulletin. August 1978, p. 700.
12. If changes in real wealth affect consumption so that
the inflation-adjusted measure of the budget balance is the
correct one, then the theoretical model in Section II should
be amended to include wealth as an argument in the ab-
sorption of goods and services in both countries.
Useful discussions of the concept of the inflation-adjusted
budget balance include Eisner and Peiper (1984), Jump
(1980), and Siegel (1979). The budgetary data used are
the combined federal, state, and local balances compiled
by the OECD. Trade-weights are clearly appropriate for
combining the rest of the world's real interest rates. How-
ever, in the case of the structural budgets, the relative size
of the country is a further consideration. The impact of a 1
percentage point change in a country's structural budget
on the bilateral rea~~*change rate with the U.S. should be
greater the larger is the size of that country's economy.
Given the influence of relative GNP on the bilateral real
rate, the impact on the real trade-weighted value of the
dollar then depends upon the trade-weight of that country.
Therefore, the weight for the foreign budget balances that
we used is the trade-weight times the relative GNP-weight.
Since GNP-weights and trade-weights are highly corre-
lated, this weighting scheme is not, in fact, very different
from pure trade weights.
Since the relative effects of Band B* on the real exchange
rate depends upon the relative size of the U.S. versus the
rest of the world, there is no reason in principle why the
coefficients on the two budget balances should be con-
strained to be of equal absolute value, as is the case with
U.S. and foreign interest rates.
13. This point is rigorously demonstrated in Frankel
(1979).
14. Os is calculated as U.S. federal government debt less
liabilities to foreign official institutions and the Federal Re-
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serve. Ww equals Os plus central government debt net of
central bank holdings in the six foreign countries. LCA is
the value of U.S. net external assets in 1970 plus the U.S.
current account surplus cumulated quarterly from 1971 :01
on. The source of data for central government debt and
the U.S. current account is the International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics. U.S. liabilities to
official institutions is taken from U.S. Treasury Department,
Treasury Bulletin. Since the supply of U.S. debt is mea-
sured net of U.S. liabilities to official institutions, the cu-
mulative current account is also measured net of changes
in these liabilities.
* The domestic (Dd) and rest of world (Dd) demand functions
for U.S. government debt may be expressed as proportions
of total government bond holdings (both foreign and do-
mestic), Wand W*, of residents in each country. (The pro-
portions of this wealth invested in the rest of the world's
government debt equal one minus the percentages in-
vested in U.S. debt.)
Dd = (bd + bo<l>e)w
Dd = (bd + bo<l>e)w*
This formulation assumes that domestic and foreign de-
mand for U.S. government bonds differ only by a constant
term, which is higher in the U.S. because domestic inves-
tors prefer the home country habitat. Setting the supply of
U.S. government debt, Os, equal to the total demand,
Dd + Dd' we have:
Os = (bd + bo<l>e)w + (bd + bo<l>e)w.
Letting W + W* = Ww,
Ds = bdW + bd (Ww - W) + bo<l>eww
Then solving for <l>e,
Os bd - bd W bd
<l>e ----
boWw bo Ww bo
Thus, the risk premium is a function of the ratio of the
supply of U.S. government debt, Os, to the total supply of
government debt (both foreign and domestic), Ww, and also
the ratio to total U.S. holdings of government bonds (both
foreign and domestic), W, to total government debt. We
measure W by adding to total U.S. government debt an
amount that is some fraction of the cumulative current ac-
count surplus since only a portion of net private investment
abroad goes into government bonds. This gives the values
of <l>e to be substituted into equation 8 for the real exchange
rate.
bd
- bd + bd D bd - b; 2:CA bd
or <l>e ~ - 0' --- - -
Ww bo Ww bo
15. Since the estimated coefficient on each of the lagged
differentials in short rates equals n times the weights in the
distributed lag of an ordinary term structure relationship,
and the sum of the estimated coefficients should be ap-
proximately equal to n, the original weights in the term
structure can be obtained by dividing each estimated coef-
ficient on the lagged differential in short rates by n. Thesynthetic real long-term interest differential is then obtained
by applying these derived weights to the current and past
differentials in real short-term rates.
16. Hutchison and Pigott show that a permanent real ex-
change rate appreciation following a fiscal stimulus is likely
under a wide range of plausible conditions. These condi-
tions include a low risk premium and both modest output
responses and small world interest rate increases in re-
sponse to the fiscal stimulus.
17. When equation 2 in Table 1 is estimated through
1985:02, its predicted value for 1985:03 is almost exactly
equal to the actual value of the real exchange rate.
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